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On Physical Layer Security over Fox’s H-Function
Wiretap Fading Channels
Long Kong, Georges Kaddoum, Member, IEEE, and Hatim Chergui, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Most of the well-known fading distributions, if not
all of them, could be encompassed by the Fox’s H-function fading.
Consequently, we investigate the physical layer security (PLS)
over Fox’s H-function fading wiretap channels, in the presence
of non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers. In particular, for
the non-colluding scenario, closed-form expressions are derived
for the secrecy outage probability (SOP), the probability of non-
zero secrecy capacity (PNZ), and the average secrecy capacity
(ASC). These expressions are given in terms of either univariate
or bivariate Fox’s H-function. In order to show the effective-
ness of our derivations, three metrics are respectively listed
over the following frequently used fading channels, including
Rayleigh, Weibull, Nakagami-m, α − µ, Fisher-Snedecor (F-S)
F , and extended generalized-K (EGK). Our tractable results
are not only straightforward and general, but also feasible and
applicable, especially the SOP, which is usually limited to the
lower bound in the literature due to the difficulty of deriving
closed-from analytical expressions. For the colluding scenario,
a super eavesdropper equipped with maximal ratio combining
(MRC) or selection-combining (SC) schemes is characterized.
The lower bound of SOP and exact PNZ are thereafter derived
with closed-form expressions in terms of the multivariate Fox’s
H-function. In order to validate the accuracy of our analytical
results, Monte-Carlo simulations are subsequently conducted for
the aforementioned fading channels. One can observe that for
the former non-colluding scenario, we have perfect agreement
between the exact analytical and simulation results, and highly
accurate approximations between the exact and asymptotic an-
alytical results. On the contrary, the SOP and PNZ of colluding
eavesdropper is greatly degraded with the increase of the number
of eavesdroppers. Also, the so-called super eavesdropper with
MRC is much powerful to wiretap the main channel than the
one with SC.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, Fox’s H-function wiretap
fading channels, Mellin transform, secrecy outage probability,
probability of non-zero secrecy capacity, average secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
D
IFFERENT wireless systems are usually characterized
with various statistical models. For example, the gamma-
gamma distribution was introduced to model the free space op-
tical (FSO) communication link [1], [2], and Fisher-Snedecor
(F-S) F to model the device-to-device communication [3],
[4]. As such, many endeavors have been drawn to investigate
the mathematical characteristics of secure transmission for
different communication scenarios.
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Dating back to the fundamental works of physical layer
security (PLS) from the information theoretical perspective,
Shannon and Wyner are undoubtedly the pioneers in this
field [5], [6]. They established the mathematical background
of perfect secrecy and wiretap channel models. Later on,
Wyner’s classic wiretap model was investigated over additive
white Gaussian noise channel (AWGN) and Rayleigh fading
channels [7], [8]. Over the past decades, plenty of research
efforts have been pursued on the investigation of PLS over
various fading channels, such as Rayleigh [8], Rician [9], [10],
Nakagami-m, Weibull [11], Lognormal [12], generalized-K
[13]–[17], and α − µ (or, equivalently, generalized gamma)
[18]–[23], α − η − κ − µ [24], etc. Secrecy outage probability
(SOP), the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity (PNZ),
and the average secrecy capacity (ASC) are the three typical
and frequently studied secrecy metrics.
As more new communication topologies appear, e.g.,
device-to-device (D2D) communications, FSO communica-
tions, intervehicle communication, millimeterwave (mmWave)
communications, wireless body area networks (WBAN), and
cognitive radios, the existing models become obsolete. As
such, more advanced and better suited fading models were
subsequently proposed and analyzed, such as α − µ [25],
κ − µ/η − µ [26], F-S F [3], [4], the extended generalized-K
(EGK) [27], cascaded α − µ fading [28], among many other
fading channels.
With the emergence of various fading models, a unified and
generic fading model is required to subsume most, if not all,
of these fading distributions. Fox’s H-function distribution,
reported in [29]–[31], is one possible model to accommo-
date various fading models with high flexibility. It was first
introduced in [32] and [33] as a pure mathematical finding,
and can be generalized to the Gamma, exponential, Chi-
square, Weibull, Rayleigh, Half-Normal distribution, etc. Other
examples, including generalized-K, α − µ, F-S F , and EGK,
were recently explored by Alhennawi et al. [29] and Rahama
et al. [34]. These findings were achieved by transforming these
probability density distributions (PDFs) of received signal-to-
noise ratios (SNRs) in terms of Fox’s H-function.
The feasibility and applicability of Fox’s H-function distri-
bution as a general fading model for wireless communication
is not new. In [27], a variation of Fox’s H-function fading
model was proposed as a general model for most well-known
distributions. Jeong et al. found that Fox’s H-function distribu-
tion offers a better fading model of vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V)
communication than other ordinary fading distributions [35].
More recently, Alhennawi et al. in [29] derived the symbol
error rate (SER) and channel capacity of single- and multiple-
2branch diversity receivers when communicating over Fox’s H-
function fading channels. As a consequence, the advantages of
Fox’s H-function fading are threefold:
• The genericity of its form for most distribution, e.g.,
Rayleigh, Nakagami-m, Weibull, α − µ, etc;
• The simplicity and the generality of it to derive the
key performance metrics of wireless communications sys-
tems, e.g., outage probability, SER, and channel capacity
[29].
• The possibility of using its distribution to study the PLS
analysis over α − µ, F-S F fading channels [20], [22],
[28], [36].
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, apart from the inves-
tigation of PLS over the aforementioned fading channels [8]–
[22], including generalized-K, α − µ, κ − µ [37]–[39], F-S
F [36], no works has ever been found to analyze the PLS
over the general Fox’s H-function fading channels. To this
end, this paper is subject to the investigation of PLS over
Fox’s H-function fading channels, with consideration of the
non-colluding and colluding eavesdropping scenarios.
A. Our Work and Contributions
The contributions of this paper are multifold, which are
listed as follows:
1) Novel exact and closed-form expressions are initially
derived for the secrecy metrics, including the SOP, PNZ,
and ASC. Our formulations, in terms of univariate or
bivariate Fox’s H-function, are given in simple and
tractable mathematical expressions.
2) The difficulty of deriving closed-form expressions for the
SOP explicitly lies in tractable integrals. Consequently,
many works can be found on the development of lower
bound of the SOP (Pout = Pr(Cs ≥ Rs)). Since the
lower bound of SOP is actually the complementary of
the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity, i.e., Pnz =
Pr(Cs > 0), it is much easier to obtain the lower bound
of the SOP and PNZ, which can be found in [25]. Strictly
speaking, our work fills this gap of lacking exact closed-
form SOP expressions.
3) The obtained general and unified secrecy metrics’ ex-
pressions are found identical with the existing works
when being compared with Monte-Carlo simulation re-
sults. Moreover, the obtained secrecy expressions can be
straightforward applied to other transformable but not
listed herein wiretap fading channels.
4) The asymptotic behaviors of these secrecy metrics are
also obtained for the sake of providing simple but highly
accurate approximations of secrecy metrics at high aver-
age signal-to-noise (SNR) regime.
5) Considering the colluding eavesdropping scenario with
maximal ratio combining (MRC) and selection combining
(SC) schemes, the lower bound of the SOP and exact
PNZ are characterized in terms of multivariate Fox’s H-
function.
Resultantly, the obtained analytical results are especially ben-
eficial since the analytical expressions themselves (i) provide
a unified approach to analyze the PLS over a generalized
fading model; (ii) serve as an efficient and convenient tool
to validate and compare the special cases of Fox’s H-function
fading channels; and (iii) enable researchers and wireless com-
munication engineers to quickly evaluate secrecy performance
when encountering security risks.
B. Structure and Notations
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II
illustrates Fox’s H-function fading and its Mellin transform.
In Section III, the system model and problem formulation are
presented. In the presence of non-colluding and colluding sce-
narios, secrecy analysis are respectively conducted in Sections
IV, V, and VI, together with several examples. Afterwards, in
Section VII, numerical results and discussions are presented.
Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper.
Mathematical Functions and Notations: j ,
√
−1, Γ(.)
is the complete Gamma function, Hm,np,q [.] is the univariate
Fox’s H-function [40, eq. (1.2)], Hm,n;m1,n1 ;m2,n2p,q;p1,q1;p2,q2 is the ex-
tended generalized bivariate Fox’s H-function [40, eq. (2.56)].
H
m,n;m1,n1 ;· · · ;mL,nL
p,q;p1,q1;· · · ;pL ,qL is the multivariate Fox’s H-function [40,
eq. (2.56)]. f (x) and F(x) represent the probability density
function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
x, respectively. B(x, y) is the Beta function [41, eq. (8.380.1)].
M[ f (x), s] denotes the Mellin transform of f (x). Res[ f (x), s]
represents the residue of function f (x) at pole x = p. Ψ0(·) is
the digamma function.
II. PRELIMINARY
A. Fox’s H-function Fading
Consider a wireless communication link over a fading
channel, where the instantaneous SNR at user k, γk , follows
Fox’s H-function PDF, given by [32]
fk (γk) = κHm,np,q
[
λγk
 (ai, Ai)i=1:p(bl, Bl)l=1:q
]
, γ > 0,
(a)
=
κ
2pi j
∫
L
Θk(s)(λγk)−sds,
(1)
where λ > 0 and κ are constants such that
∫ ∞
0
fk (γk)dγk = 1.
(xi, yi)l is a shorthand for (x1, y1), · · · , (xl, yl). Step (a) is
developed by expressing Fox’s H-function in terms of its
definition [40, eq. (1.2)]. Ai > 0 for all i = 1, · · · , p, and Bl > 0
for all l = 1, · · · , q. 0 ≤ m ≤ q, 0 ≤ n ≤ p, L is a suitable
contour separating the poles of the gamma functions Γ(bl+Bls)
from the poles of the gamma functions Γ(1 − ai − Ais),
Θk(s) =
m∏
l=1
Γ(bl + Bls)
n∏
i=1
Γ(1 − ai − Ais)
q∏
l=m+1
Γ(1 − bl − Bls)
p∏
i=n+1
Γ(ai + Ais)
. (2)
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the received
SNR at user k, i.e., γk is given by [32, eqs. (3.9) and (3.7)]
Fk(γk) =
κ
λ
H
m,n+1
p+1,q+1
[
λγk
 (1, 1), (ai + Ai, Ai)p(bl + Bl, Bl)q, (0, 1)
]
, (3a)
or
Fk(γk) = 1 − κ
λ
H
m+1,n
p+1,q+1
[
λγk
 (ai + Ai, Ai)p, (1, 1)(0, 1), (bl + Bl, Bl)q
]
= 1 − F¯k(γk),
(3b)
3TABLE I: Exact expressions of fk(γk) for different special
cases of Fox’s H-function distribution
Ins. SNR fk (γk )
α − µ
[27, Tab. V]
fk (γk ) = κH1,00,1
[
λγk
 −(µ − 1
α
, 1
α
)
]
,
where κ = β
Γ(µ)γ¯k , λ =
β
γ¯k
, β =
Γ
(
µ+ 1α
)
Γ(µ) .
F-S F
[3, eq. (5)]
fk (γk ) = κH1,11,1
[
λγk
 (−mk,s, 1)(mk − 1, 1)
]
,
where κ = λ
Γ(mk )Γ(mk,s ), λ =
mk
mk,s γ¯k
.
EGK
[34, eq. (18)]
fk (γk ) = κH2,00,2
[
λγk
 −(ml − 1ξl , 1ξl ), (msl − 1ξsl , 1ξsl )
]
,
where κ = βl βsl
Γ(ml )Γ(msl )γ¯k , λ =
βl βsl
γ¯k
, βl =
Γ
(
ml+
1
ξl
)
Γ(ml ) ,
and βsl =
Γ
(
msl+
1
ξsl
)
Γ(msl ) .
where F¯k(γ) is the complementary CDF (CCDF). For the
notational convenience, Θ f
k
and ΘF
k
are used thereafter to
denote the PDF and CDF of Fox’s H-function, respectively.
The Mellin transform of fk (γ) is defined and given as [29, eq.
(5)] [40, eq. (2.8)],
M[ fk(γk), s] =
∫ ∞
0
fk (γk)γs−1dγk = κλ−sΘk(s). (4)
B. Special cases
As mentioned before, Fox’s H-function distribution pro-
vides enough flexibility to accommodate most fading distri-
butions. As a result, the objective herein is to list some well-
known examples, such as the α − µ1, F-S F , and EGK, as
shown in Table. I, where γ¯k is the average received SNR at
user k.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
The Alice-Bob-Eve classic wiretap model is used here to
illustrate a legitimate transmission link (Alice → Bob) in
the presence of a malicious eavesdropper. In such a wiretap
channel model, the transmitter Alice (A) wishes to send secret
messages to the intended receiver Bob (B) in the presence
of an eavesdropper Eve (E); the link between A and B is
called the main channel, whereas the one between A and E
is named as the wiretap channel. It is assumed that (i) all
users are equipped with a single antenna; (ii) both links are
independent and subjected to Fox’s H-function fading; (iii) a
perfect channel state information (CSI) is available at all users.
As a result, the received SNRs at B and E are denoted as
γk, k ∈ {B, E}, which follow Fox’s H-function PDF, and are
respectively given by
fB(γB) = κBHm0,n0p0,q0
[
λBγB
 (ai, Ai)i=1:p0(bl, Bl)l=1:q0
]
, γB > 0, (5a)
1Since α − µ distributions can be attributed to exponential, one-sided
Gaussian, Rayleigh, Nakagami-m, Weibull and Gamma fading distributions
by assigning specific values for α and µ, respectively [25], secrecy analysis
on these fading distributions is thus omitted herein.
fE (γE ) = κEHm1,n1p1,q1
[
λEγE
 (ci,Ci)i=1:p1(dl, Dl)l=1:q1
]
, γE > 0. (5b)
B. Problem Formulation
According to [8], the secrecy capacity over fading wiretap
channels is defined as the difference between the main channel
capacity CM = log2(1 + γB) and the wiretap channel capacity
CW = log2(1 + γE ) as follows
Cs =
{
CM − CW , γB > γE
0, otherwise.
(6)
In other words, a positive secrecy capacity can be assured if
and only if the received SNR at Bob has a superior quality
than that at Eve’s.
1) Secrecy Outage Probability: The outage probability of
the secrecy capacity is defined as the probability that the
secrecy capacity Cs falls below the target secrecy rate Rt , i.e.,
Pout (Rs) = Pr(Cs < Rt ). (7)
Technically speaking, SOP can be conceptually explained as
two cases: (i) Cs < Rt whilst positive secrecy capacity is surely
guaranteed; (ii) secrecy outage definitely happens when CS is
non-positive. To this end, (7) can be rewritten as follows [13],
[42],
Pout (Rs) = Pr(γB ≤ RsγE + Rs − 1)
=
∫ ∞
0
FB(γ0) fE (γE )dγE,
(8)
where Rs = 2Rt , γ0 = RsγE +W, and W = Rs − 1.
The SOP characterizes the probability of failure to achieve
a reliable and secure transmission. In addition, it shows that
PLS can be achieved by fading alone, even when Eve has a
better average SNR than Bob.
2) Probability of Non-Zero Secrecy Capacity: The PNZ
refers to the event that the positive secrecy capacity can
be surely achieved, namely Pr(Cs > 0), thus respecting its
definition, (6) can be further rewritten as follows,
Pnz = Pr(γB > γE ) =
∫ ∞
0
fB(γB)FE (γB)dγB . (9)
3) Average Secrecy Capacity: average secrecy capacity
provides a mathematical indicator of the capacity limit for
a given constraint of perfect secrecy.
By using some simple mathematical manipulations, the ASC
can be further re-expressed as the sum of three terms, which
are given by [14]
C¯s =
∫ ∞
0
log2(1 + γB) fB(γB)FE (γB)dγB︸                                          ︷︷                                          ︸
I1
+
∫ ∞
0
log2(1 + γE ) fE (γE )FB(γE )dγE︸                                         ︷︷                                         ︸
I2
−
∫ ∞
0
log2(1 + γE ) fE (γE )dγE︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
I3
.
(10)
For the brevity of the following derivations, let gk(γk) = ln(1+
γk) fB(γk).
4Pout = 1 −
κBκEW
λBRs
H
0,1:n1+1,m1 :n0,m0
1,0:q1,p1+1:q0,p0+1
[
Rs
λEW ,
1
λBW
(2, 1, 1)−
 (1 − dl, Dl)l=1:q1(1, 1), (1 − ci,Ci)i=1:p1
 (1 − bl − Bl, Bl)l=1:q0(1 − ai − Ai, Ai)i=1:p0, (0, 1)
]
, (13)
IV. SECRECY METRICS CHARACTERIZATION
To begin the characterization of the secrecy performance
over Fox’s H-function fading channels, one useful and unified
theorem is first provided. This theorem is essentially beneficial
to the acquisition of the final closed-form expressions for the
aforementioned three secrecy metrics.
Theorem 1. Consider a general fading channel where the
received SNR’s PDF is f (γ) and another function u(γ). Sup-
pose their Mellin transforms are M[ f (γ), s] and M[u(γ), s],
respectively. If the Mellin transform of u(γ) exists, then by us-
ing Parseval’s formula for Mellin transform [43, eq. (8.3.23)],
we have∫ ∞
0
f (γ)u(γ)dγ = 1
2pi j
∫
L
M[ f (γ), s]M[u(γ), 1 − s]ds, (11)
where L is the integration path from υ − j∞ to υ + j∞, and
υ is a constant.
The aforementioned Theorem is recalled to make a basis for
the following derivations. To this end, we have the following
remark.
Remark 1. The SOP, PNZ, and ASC over Fox’s H-function
fading wiretap channels are respectively given by
Pout = 1
2pi j
∫
L1
M[FB(γ0), 1 − s]M[ fE (γE ), s]ds, (12a)
Pnz = 1
2pi j
∫
L1
M[FE(γB), 1 − s]M[ fB(γB), s]ds, (12b)
C¯s =
1
2pi j
∫
L1
M[gB(γE ), 1 − s]M[FE (γB), s]ds
+
1
2pi j
∫
L1
M[gE(γE ), 1 − s]M[FB(γE ), s]ds
− 1
2pi j
∫
L1
M[ fE (γE ), 1 − s]M[ln(1 + γE ), s]ds
(12c)
Proof. Recalling (8), (9), and (10), and then using Theorem
1, the proofs for (12a), (12b), and (12c) are directly accom-
plished. 
A. SOP Characterization
1) Exact SOP Characterization:
Theorem 2. The SOP over Fox’s H-function fading wiretap
channels is given by (13), shown at the top of this page.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
2) Lower Bound of SOP: As γ¯B and γ¯E tend to ∞, we
have
Pout = Pr
(
log2
(
1 + γB
1 + γE
)
< Rt
)
≈ Pr
(
log2
(
γB
γE
)
< Rt
)
︸                 ︷︷                 ︸
PLout
=
∫ ∞
0
FB(Rsy) fE (y)dy. (14)
Proposition 1. As γ¯B and γ¯E tend to ∞, the lower bound of
the SOP over Fox’s H-function fading channels is given by
(15), shown at the top of next page.
Proof. By applying the Mellin transform of the product of
two Fox’s H-function [44, eq. (2.25.1.1)], the proof is accom-
plished. 
B. PNZ Characterization
Theorem 3. The PNZ over Fox’s H-function wiretap fading
channels is given by (16), shown at the top of next page.
Proof. According to (12b), M[FE (γB), 1 − s] and
M[ fB(γB), s] are separately given by
M[FE(γB), 1 − s] = κE
λ2−s
E
Θ
F
E (1 − s), (17a)
M[ fB(γB), s] = κB
λs
B
Θ
f
B
(s). (17b)
Next, substituting (17a) and (17b) into (12b), yields the
following result
Pnz = κBκE
2λ2
E
pi j
∫
L1
Θ
f
B
(s)ΘFE (1 − s)
(
λB
λE
)−s
ds, (18)
Subsequently, directly applying the definition of univariate
Fox’s H-function, the proof is achieved.
Alternatively, we provide another method to prove (16).
Revisiting (9) and directly replacing fB(γB) and FE (γB) with
their expressions, we have
Pnz = κBκE
λE
∫ ∞
0
H
m0,n0
p0,q0
[
λBγB
 (ai, Ai)i=1:p0(bl, Bl)l=1:q0
]
× Hm1,n1+1
p1+1,q1+1
[
λEγB
 (1, 1), (ci + Ci,Ci)i=1:p1(dl + Dl, Dl)l=1:q1, (0, 1)
]
dγB,
(19)
where the last step is derived by using the Mellin transform of
the product of two Fox’s H-function [44, eq. (2.25.1.1)]. 
C. ASC Characterization
Theorem 4. The ASC over Fox’s H-function wiretap fading
channels is given by
C¯s =
1
ln(2) (I1 + I2 − I3), (20)
5PLout = 1 −
κBκE
λBλE
H
m1+n2+1,n1+m2
p1+q2+1,q1+p2+1
[
λBRs
λE
 (ai + Ai, Ai)i=1:n1, (1 − dl − Dl, Dl)l=1:q2, (ai + Ai, Ai)i=n1+:p1, (1, 1)(0, 1), (bl + Bl, Bl)l=1:m1, (1 − ci − Ci,Ci)i=1:p2, (bl + Bl, Bl)l=m1+1:q1
]
. (15)
Pnz = κBκE
λBλE
H
m1+n0,n1+m0+1
p0+q1+1,q0+p1+1
[
λE
λB
 (1, 1), (ci + Ci,Ci)i=1:p1, (1 − bl − Bl, Bl)l=1:q0, (ci + Ci,Ci)i=n1+1:p1(dl + Dl, Dl)l=1:m1, (1 − ai − Ai, Ai)i=1:p0, (0, 1), (dl + Dl, Dl)l=m1+1:q1
]
, (16)
I1 =
κBκE
λBλE
H
n0,m0:1,2:m1,n1+1
q0,p0 :2,2:p1+1,q1+1
[
1
λB
,
λE
λB
 (1 − bl − Bl; Bl, Bl)l=1:q0(1 − ai − Ai; Ai, Ai)i=1:p0
 (1, 1), (1, 1)(1, 1), (0, 1)
 (1, 1), (ci + Ci,Ci)i=1:q1(dl + Dl, Dl)l=1:p1, (0, 1)
]
, (21a)
I2 =
κBκE
λBλE
H
n1,m1 :1,2:m0,n0+1
q1,p1:2,2:p0+1,q0+1
[
1
λE
,
λB
λE
 (1 − dl − Dl; Dl, Dl)l=1:q1(1 − ci − Ci ;Ci,Ci)i=1:p1
 (1, 1), (1, 1)(1, 1), (0, 1)
 (1, 1), (ai + Ai, Ai)i=1:p0(bl + Bl, Bl)l=1:q0, (0, 1)
]
, (21b)
where I1 and I2 are respectively given by (21a) and (21b),
shown at the top of this page, and
I3 =
κE
λE
H
n1+1,m1+2
q1+2,p1+2
[
1
λE
 (1, 1), (1, 1), (1 − dl − Dl, Dl)l=1:p1(1, 1), (1 − ci − Ci,Ci)i=1:q1, (0, 1)
]
.
(22)
Proof. See Appendix B 
D. Special Cases
Accommodating the closed-form expressions for secrecy
performance metrics in the corresponding entries in Table I,
directly yields the results, as displayed in Table II. After some
simple algebraic manipulations, one can observe the obtained
results herein are consistent with the existing works [18], [20],
[22], [36].
V. ASYMPTOTIC SECRECY METRICS CHARACTERIZATION
The obtained secrecy expressions are given in terms of
either univariate or bivariate Fox’s H-function. In order to
provide more insights at high or low SNR regime, the asymp-
totic behavior of the three aforementioned secrecy metrics are
developed in this section.
According to [45], expansions of the univariate and bivariate
Fox’s H-functions can be derived by evaluating the residue
of the corresponding integrands at the closest poles to the
contour, namely, the minimum pole on the right for large Fox’s
H-function arguments and the maximum pole on the left for
small ones.
A. Asymptotic SOP
The lower bound of the SOP is still expressed in terms of
Fox’s H-function, in order to study the asymptotic behavior of
the SOP, the lower bound is further simplified by expanding
the univariate Fox’s H-function. Consequently, at high γ¯B
regime, we have 1
λB
→ ∞. By using the expanding rule, the
asymptotic SOP is given by (23), shown at the top of next
page.
Taking the case of α − µ distribution as an example, the
lower bound of the SOP is given by
PLout = 1 −
κBκE
λBλE
H
2,1
2,2

λBRs
λE

(
1 − µE, 1αE
)
, (1, 1)
(0, 1),
(
µB,
1
αB
)  . (24)
For the sake of high accuracy, the asymptotic SOP at high γ¯B
regime is evaluated at τ = 0 and τ = −αBµB , and is given by
[22]
Pout ≈
Γ
(
αBµB
αE
+ µE
)
Γ(1 + µB)Γ(µE)
(
RsλB
λE
)αBµB
. (25)
B. Asymptotic PNZ
The asymptotic PNZ at high or low γ¯B regime, is computed
by evaluating the residues of analytical PNZ, given in (16).
According to [34], Fox’s H-function can be further simplified
by choosing the dominate term of the Mellin-Barnes type
integral. As such, we can evaluate the residue of the PNZ
at low γ¯B regime, at the point
τ = min
l=1:m1,i=1:n0
(
−dl + Dl
Dl
,
ai + Ai − 1
Ai
)
, (26a)
g = argmin
l=1:m1,i=1:n0
(
−dl + Dl
Dl
,
ai + Ai − 1
Ai
)
. (26b)
Assuming the case of a simple pole, the asymptotic PNZ is
thereafter given in (27).
Considering the case of α − µ as an example, applying
the obtained result, the asymptotic PNZ at low γ¯B regime is
evaluated at s = −αE µE and thereafter given by
Pnz ≈
κBκE
λBλE µE
Γ
(
αE µE
αB
+ µB
) (
λE
λB
)αE µE
. (28)
C. Asymptotic ASC
By applying the expansion rule, in the case of high γ¯B ,
the asymptotic ASC is given by (29), which is obtained by
individually expanding I1 and I2, respectively. The detailed
proof for (29) is referenced to Appendix. C.
Similarly, taking the case of α − µ as an example, we get
the asymptotic ASC at high γ¯B regime as
I1 ≈ κBκE
λBλE
Γ(µB)Γ(µE)
[
Ψ0(µB)
αB
− ln(λB)
]
, (30a)
I2 ≈
κBκE
(
λB
λE
)αBµB
µBλBλE
H
3,1
2,3
[
λE
 (0, 1), (1, 1)(µE + αBµBαE , 1αE ), (0, 1), (0, 1)
]
.
(30b)
6TABLE II: Exact expressions of Pout , Pnz and C¯s for different special cases of Fox’s H-function distribution
Pout = 1 − κB κEWλBRs H
0,1:1,1:0,1
1,0:1,1:1,1
[
Rs
λEW ,
1
λBW
 (2, 1, 1)−
 (1 − µE + 1αE , 1αE )(1, 1)
 (1 − µB, 1αB )(0, 1)
]
Pnz = κB κEλBλE H
2,1
2,2
[
λE
λB
 (1 − µB,
1
αB
), (1, 1)
(µE, 1αE ), (0, 1)
]
α − µ C¯s = κB κEλBλE H
0,1:1,2:1,1
1,0:2,2:1,2
[
1
λB
,
λE
λB
 (1 − µB ; 1αB , 1αB )−
 (1, 1), (1, 1)(1, 1), (0, 1)
 (1, 1)(µE, 1αE ), (0, 1)
]
+
κB κE
λBλE
H
0,1:1,2:1,1
1,0:2,2:1,2
[
1
λE
,
λB
λE
 (1 − µE ; 1αE , 1αE )−
 (1, 1), (1, 1)(1, 1), (0, 1)
 (1, 1)(µB, 1αB ), (0, 1)
]
− κE
λE
H
1,3
3,2
[
1
λE
 (1, 1), (1, 1), (1 − µE, 1αE )(1, 1), (0, 1)
]
Pout = 1 − κB κEWλBRs H
0,1:2,1:1,1
1,0:1,2:1,2
[
Rs
λEW ,
1
λBW
 (2, 1, 1)−
 (2 −mE, 1)(1, 1), (1 +mE,s, 1)
 (1 −mB, 1)(mB,s, 1), (0, 1)
]
Pnz = κB κEλBλE H
2,3
3,3
[
λE
λB
 (1, 1), (−mB,s, 1), (1 −mE, 1), (0, 1)(mE, 1), (−1, 1), (mE,s, 1), (0, 1)
]
F-S F C¯s = κB κEλBλE H
1,1:1,2:1,2
1,1:2,2:2,2
[
1
λB
,
λE
λB
 (mB ; 1, 1)(mB,s ; 1, 1)
 (1, 1), (1, 1)(1, 1), (0, 1)
 (1, 1), (1 −mE,s, 1)(mE, 1), (0, 1)
]
+
κB κE
λBλE
H
1,1:1,2:1,2
1,1:2,2:2,2
[
1
λE
,
λB
λE
 (mE ; 1, 1)(mE,s; 1, 1)
 (1, 1), (1, 1)(1, 1), (0, 1)
 (1, 1), (1 −mE,s, 1)(mE, 1), (0, 1)
]
− κE
λE
H
2,3
3,3
[
1
λE
 (1, 1), (1, 1), (1 −mE, 1)(1, 1), (mE,s, 1), (0, 1)
]
Pout = 1− κB κEWλBRs H
0,1:1,1:0,2
1,0:2,1:2,1
[
Rs
λEW ,
1
WλB
 (2, 1, 1)−
 (1 −mE + 1ξE , 1ξE ), (1 −msE + 1ξsE , 1ξsE )(1, 1)
 (1 −mB, 1ξB ), (1 −msB, 1ξsB )(0, 1)
]
Pnz = κB κEλBλE H
2,3
3,3
[
λE
λB
 (1, 1), (1 −mB,
1
ξB
), (1 −msB, 1ξsB )
(mE, 1ξE ), (msE,
1
ξsE
), (0, 1)
]
EGK C¯s =
κB κE
λBλE
H
0,2:1,2:3,0
2,0:2,2:1,3
[
1
λB
,
λE
λB
 (1 −mB ; 1ξB , 1ξB ), (1 −msB, 1ξsB , 1ξsB )−
 (1, 1), (1, 1)(1, 1), (0, 1)
 (1, 1)(mE, 1ξE ), (msE, 1ξsE ), (0, 1)
]
+
κB κE
λBλE
H
0,2:1,2:3,0
2,0:2,2:1,3
[
1
λE
,
λB
λE
 (1 −mE ; 1ξE , 1ξE ), (1 −msE ; 1ξsE , 1ξsE )−
 (1, 1), (1, 1)(1, 1), (0, 1)
 (1, 1)(mB, 1ξB ), (msB, 1ξsB ), (0, 1)
]
− κE
λE
H
4,1
2,4
[
1
λE
 (1, 1), (1, 1)(1, 1), (mE − 1ξE , 1ξE ), (msE − 1ξsE , 1ξsE ), (0, 1)
]
PLout ≈1 −
κBκE
λBλE
Γ(τ)
m0∏
l=1,l,g
Γ(bl + Bl + Blτ)
n1∏
i=1
Γ(1 − ci − Ci + Ciτ)
n0∏
i=1
Γ(1 − ai − Ai + Aiτ)
Γ(1 + τ)
q0∏
l=m0+1
Γ(1 − bl − Bl − Blτ)
p0∏
i=n0+1
Γ(ai + Ai + Aiτ)
p2∏
i=n1+1
Γ(ci + Ci − Ciτ)
×
m1∏
l=1
Γ(dl + Dl − Dlτ)
q1∏
l=m1+1
Γ(1 − dl − Dl + Dlτ)
(
λE
λBRs
)τ
, where τ = max
l=1:m0
(
−bl + Bl
Bl
)
, g = argmax
l=1:m0
(
−bl + Bl
Bl
)
.
(23)
Pnz ≈
(
λB
λE
)s
κBκE
λBλE
Γ(−τ)
m1∏
l=1,l,g
Γ(dl + Dl + Dlτ)
n0∏
i=1,i,g
Γ(1 − ai − Ai + Aiτ)
n1∏
i=1
Γ(1 − ci − Ci − Ciτ)
m0∏
l=1
Γ(bl + Bl − Blτ)
Γ(1 − τ)
p0∏
i=n0+1
Γ(ai + Ai − Aiτ)
q1∏
l=m1+1
Γ(1 − dl − Dl − Dlτ)
p1∏
i=n1+1
Γ(ci + Ci + Ciτ)
q0∏
l=m0+1
Γ(1 − bl − Bl + Blτ)
,
(27)
VI. COLLUDING EAVESDROPPING SCENARIO
In this section, we mainly focus on the secrecy issue when
multiple eavesdroppers appear and work in a cooperative
manner.
A. System Model
Consider the scenario that L eavesdroppers are in the
presence and work cooperatively to wiretap the main link. It is
assumed that all L eavesdroppers are single-antenna equipped,
7I1 ≈ κBκE
λBλE
[
ln
(
1
λB
)
+
m0∑
l=1
BlΨ0(bl + Bl + Blu) −
q0∑
l=ml+1
BlΨ0(bl + Bl + Blu) −
p0∑
i=1
AiΨ0(ai + Ai + Aiu)
]
×
(
λE
λB
)s
Γ(u)
m0∏
l=1,l,g
Γ(bl + Bl + Blu)
n1∏
i=1,i,g
Γ(1 − ci − Ci + Ciu)
m1∏
l=1
Γ(dl + Dl − Dlu)
Γ(1 + u)
q0∏
l=m1+1
Γ(1 − bl − Bl − Blu)
p0∏
i=n1+1
Γ(ai + Ai + Aiu)
p1∏
i=n2+1
Γ(ci + Ci − Ciu)
q1∏
l=m2+1
Γ(1 − dl − Dl − Dlu)
,
where u = max
l=1:m0,i=1:n1
[
0,
(
−bl + Bl
Bl
)
l=1:m0
,
(
ci + Ci − 1
ci
)
i=1:n1
]
, g = argmax
l=1:m0,i=1:n1
[
0,
(
−bl + Bl
Bl
)
l=1:m0
,
(
ci + Ci − 1
ci
)
i=1:n1
]
,
(29a)
I2 ≈
m0∏
l=1,l,g
Γ(bl + Bl − Blu)
(
λE
λB
)u
κBκE
λBλE
Γ(u)
n0∏
i=1
Γ(1 − ai − Ai + Aiu)
Γ(1 + u)
n0+1∏
i=1
Γ(ai + Ai − Aiu)
m0+1∏
l=1
Γ(1 − bl − Bl + Blu)
× Hn1+1,m1+2
q1+2,p1+2
[
λE
 (1, 1), (1, 1), (1 − dl − Dl, Dl)l=1:p1, (1, 1)(0, 1), (0, 1), (dl + Dl + Dls), (1 − ci − Ci,Ci)i=1:q1
]
, where u = 1 +min
(
bl
Bl
)
l=1:m0
, g = argmin
l=1:m0
(
bl
Bl
)
.
(29b)
fC (γ) = ηC
γ
H

(
0, 0
0, 1
)
(
mr, nr + 1
pr + 1, qr
)
r=1:L

−
(1; (1)r=1:L)[(1, 1), (ci + Ci,Ci)i=1:qr
(dl + Dl, Dl)l=1:pr
]
r=1:L
 (λrγ)r=1:L

, γ > 0, (33a)
FC(γ) = ηCH

(
0, 0
0, 1
)
(
mr, nr + 1
pr + 1, qr
)
r=1:L

−
(0; (1)r=1:L)[(1, 1), (ci + Ci,Ci)i=1:qr
(dl + Dl, Dl)l=1:pr
]
r=1:L
 (λrγ)r=1:L

, (33b)
and undergoes independent fading conditions. As a result of
collusion [46], the so-called eavesdropper is assumed to either
use the MRC or the SC scheme. All the wiretap links and main
link undergo independent Fox’s H-function fading channels.
Consequently, the instantaneous received SNR at the so-called
L-colluding eavesdropper with MRC scheme is given by
γC =
L∑
r=1
γe,r, (31)
or with SC scheme
γC = max{γe,1, · · · , γe,l, · · · , γe,L}, (32)
where γe,r is the instantaneous received SNR of each eaves-
dropper. Clearly, (31) corresponds to a maximum ratio com-
bining (MRC) decoding which is the best strategy that the
super eavesdropper can use. As we can see from (31), γC is
the sum of L independent Fox’s H-function distributed RVs,
the PDF and CDF of γC are thus respectively given by [34,
eqs. (8) and (9)] where ηC =
M∏
e=1
κE,e
λE,e
.
Similarly, the PDF and CDF of instantaneous SNR deployed
with SC scheme is given by [47]
fC (γ) =
L∑
τ=1
fe,τ (γ)
L∏
l=1,l,τ
Fe,l(γ), (34a)
FC(γ) =
L∏
l=1
Fe,l(γ), (34b)
where fe,τ (γ) and Fe,l(γ) are the corresponding PDF and
CDF of the instantaneous received SNR of each eavesdropper,
which are given in terms of univariate Fox’s H-function.
It is worthy to mention that the multivariate Fox’s H-
function PDF and CDF of the equivalent super-eavesdropper
makes it difficult to seek the exact SOP and ASC for the
colluding scenario. Resultantly, we intend to provide the lower
bound of the SOP and exact PNZ for this case.
B. Secrecy Characterization of SOP
Theorem 5. The SOP over Fox’s H-function wiretap fading
channels in the presence of L-colluding eavesdroppers with
MRC scheme is lower bounded by (35), shown at the top of
next page.
Proof. Plugging (5b) and (33a) into Pout,MRC =∫ ∞
0
FB(γ0) fC(γC )dγC , then re-expressing the univariate
Fox’s H-function and multivariate Fox’s H-function in terms
of their definition, and performing the interchange of the
Mellin-Barnes integrals and the definite integral, with the
help of [41, eqs.(3.194.3) and (8.384.1)], we arrive at the
final expression of Pout,MRC in (35). 
8PLout,MRC =
ηC κB
λB
H

(
n0 + 1,m0
q0 + 1, p0 + 2
)
(
mr, nr + 1
pr + 1, qr
)
r=1:L

(1 − bi − Bi, (Bi)r=1:L), (1, (1)r=1:L)
(0, (1)r=1:L), (1 − ai − Ai, (Ai)r=1:L), (1, (1)r=1:L)[(1, 1), (ci + Ci,Ci)i=1:q2
(dl + Dl, Dl)l=1:p2
]
r=1:L

(
λe,r
λBRs
)
r=1:L

, (35)
PLout,SC =
L∑
l=1
ηCκB
λB
H

(
nl,ml
ql, pl
)
(
m0, n0 + 1
p0 + 1, q0 + 1
)
(
mr, nr + 1
pr + 1, qr
)
r=1:l−1(
mr+1, nr+1 + 1
pr+1 + 1, qr+1 + 1
)
r=l+1:L

(1 − di + Di, (Di)r=1:L)
(1 − ci + Ci, (Ci)r=1:L)
(1, 1), (ai + Ai, Ai)i=1:p0
(bl + Bl, Bl)l=1:q0[ (1, 1), (ci + Ci,Ci)i=1:pr
(dl + Dl, Dl)l=1:qr , (0, 1)
]
r=1:l−1[ (1, 1), (ci + Ci,Ci)i=1:pr
(dl + Dl, Dl)l=1:qr , (0, 1)
]
r=l+1,L

λB
λe, l(
λe,r
λe, l
)
r=1:l−1(
λe,r
λe, l
)
r=l+1:L

, (36)
Pnz,MRC = ηCκB
λB
H

(
n0, m0
q0, p0 + 1
)
(
mr, nr + 1
pr + 1, qr
)
r=1:L

(1 − bi − Bi; (Bi)r=1:L)i=1:q0
(1 − ai − Ai; (Ai)r=1:L)i=1:p0, (0; (1)r=1:L)[(1, 1), (ci + Ci,Ci)i=1:qr
(dl + Dl, Dl)l=1:pr
]
r=1:L

(
λe,r
λB
)
r=1:L

, (38)
Pnz,SC = ηC κB
λB
H

(
n0, m0
q0, p0
)
(
mr, nr + 1
pr + 1, qr + 1
)
r=1:L

(1 − bi − Bi; (Bi)r=1:L)i=1:q0
(1 − ai − Ai; (Ai)r=1:L)i=1:p0[ (1, 1), (ci + Ci,Ci)i=1:qr
(dl + Dl, Dl)l=1:pr , (0, 1)
]
r=1:L

(
λe,r
λB
)
r=1:L

, (39)
Theorem 6. The SOP over Fox’s H-function wiretap fading
channels in the presence of L-colluding eavesdroppers with
SC scheme is lower bounded by (36), shown on the top of this
page.
Proof. Accordingly, by doing some simple substitutions,
PL
out,SC
can be rewritten as
PLout,SC =
L∑
τ=1
∫ ∞
0
FB(Rsγ) fe,τ(γ)
L∏
l=1,l,τ
Fe,l(γ)dγ, (37)
next, by using the Mellin transform of multiple univariate
Fox’s H-function, the proof is achieved. 
C. Secrecy Characterization of PNZ
Theorem 7. The PNZ over Fox’s H-function wiretap fading
channels in the presence of L-colluding eavesdroppers with
MRC scheme is given by (38), shown on the top of this page.
Proof. Substituting (5a) and (33b) into (9), then re-expressing
the multivariate Fox’s H-function in terms of its definition and
interchanging the order of two integrals, we directly obtain
(38). 
Theorem 8. The PNZ over Fox’s H-function wiretap fading
channels in the presence of L-colluding eavesdroppers with
SC scheme is given by (39), shown on the top of this page.
Proof. Substituting (5a) and (34b) into
PNZ,SC =
∫ ∞
0
fB(γB)FC,SC (γB)dγB
=
∫ ∞
0
fB(γB)
L∏
l=1
Fe,l(γB)dγB,
(40)
then following the same methodology used in Theorem 6, the
proof is obtained. 
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, Monte-Carlo simulations are used to validate
the analytical derivations obtained in Sections IV and VI,
particularly, over one special case of Fox’s H-function wiretap
fading channel, i.e., α− µ wiretap fading channels2. It is noted
that bullets represent the simulation results whereas solid lines
are used to show the analytical expressions.
A. Non-colluding sceanrio
In order to validate the analytical accuracy of our deriva-
tions, Monte-Carlo simulation outcomes together with an-
alytical results are presented in Figs. 1-3, with regard to
the aforementioned three secrecy performance metrics over
α− µ fading channels. Apparently, these figures show that our
mathematical representations are in perfect agreements with
the simulation results.
In Fig. 1, the SOP against γ¯B is plotted for several fading
scenarios, such as Rayleigh, Weibull, Nakagami-m, and α− µ.
As observed from the figure, specifically, the Nakagami-m
(α = 2, µ = m) against Rayleigh (α = 2, µ = 1), and
Rayleigh against Weibull (α is the fading parameter, µ = 1),
one can conclude that larger α and µ values result in lower
SOP. This is mainly because lower α and µ values represent
serious non-linearity and sparse clustering, i.e., worse channel
conditions [20]. This phenomenon also remains true for the
2It is worthy to mention that (i) the α-µ fading channel is implemented by
using the WAFO toolbox [48]; (ii) the numerical evaluation of univariate and
bivariate Fox’s H-function for MATLAB implementations are based on the
method proposed in [49, Table. II] and [50, Appendix. A], respectively.
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Fig. 1: Pout versus the average γ¯B over Rayleigh, Nakagami-
m, Weibull and α − µ fading channels when γ¯E = 0 dB and
Rt = 0.5, respectively.
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Fig. 2: Pnz versus the average γ¯B for selected fading param-
eters when γ¯E = 4 dB.
PNZ, as shown in Fig. 2. In addition, the lower bound of
SOP and the asymptotic SOP are also plotted. It is observed
that the lower bound of the SOP, i.e., PLout offers a better
SOP performance trend prediction, on the other hand, the
asymptotic SOP gradually approximates the exact SOP with
higher accuracy as γ¯B increases.
As depicted in Fig. 2, both the exact and asymptotic
behavior of Pnz are plotted against γ¯B for Rayleigh, Weibull,
Nakagami-m, and α − µ. Compared with the exact result, one
can conclude that our asymptotic PNZ behaves well at low γ¯B
regime.
The ASC against the ratio of γ¯B and γ¯E is presented in
Fig. 3, and as expected, there is a perfect match between
our analytical and simulated results. Also, one can obtain two
insights from this graph: on one hand, lower α values lead to
higher ASC, no matter whoever experiences severe fading. The
insight obtained from this figure just vividly demonstrates how
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Fig. 3: C¯s versus
γ¯B
γ¯E
over α − µ wiretap fading channels.
information-theoretic security exploits the fading property of
wireless transmission medium to ensure secure transmission.
On the other hand, a potential malicious eavesdropper can
also benefit from poor channel conditions, since worse fading
channels reversely enable them to better access and wiretap
the main channel to a certain extent. Finally, to obtain a fair
comparison, the asymptotic ASC is also depicted in Fig. 3.
Again, it can be seen that the asymptotic ASC presents a
highly accurate approximation to the exact ASC, especially
at high γ¯B regime.
B. Colluding scenario
In this subsection, both the lower bound of SOP and PNZ
are presented over α − µ, F-S F , and EGK fading channels,
respectively. For the simplicity of notations, it is assummed
that all eavesdroppers undergo similar fading condition, i.e.,
similar fading parameters. It is noted that the implementation
of multivariate Fox’s H-function is available in Python [29,
Appendix A] and MATLAB [51].
Fig. 4 demonstrates the analytical PL
MRC,out
and PL
SC,out
together with simulated SOP over α − µ, F-S F , and EGK
fading channels, respectively. One can perceive that our de-
rived lower bound of SOP can closely approximate the exact
SOP. As the number of cooperative eavesdroppers increases,
the gap between the lower bound of SOP and exact SOP
gradually becomes smaller. On the other hand, the increase
of the number of L contributes largely to the PL
out,MRC
when
MRC scheme is employed, compared to the Pout,SC case.
Apart from Fig. 4a, we also compared the simulated and
analytical SOPs for the following two scenarios: (i) changing
γE while fixing Rt , as shown in Fig.4b; and (ii) chang-
ing Rt while keeping γE constant, as depicted in Fig. 4c.
Apparently, one can obtain the following two observations.
On one hand, Fig. 4b shows that the lower bound of the
SOP is becoming increasingly tight with the decrease of
lower Rt . Different from 4b, Fig.4c portrays that higher γ¯E
makes the lower bound of SOP sufficiently approximates the
exact SOP. Those two observations can be mathematically
explained from the definition of the lower bound of SOP, i.e.,
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P(γB < (RsγC +W)) ≈ P(γB < (RsγC )). This condition can
be met when Rt goes to 0 (W = 2Rt − 1), or γC ≫W.
Likewise, in Fig. 5, the PNZ given in (38) and (39)
are plotted and compared with Monte-Carlo simulation. The
validity of our presented PNZ expressions are examined over
the α−µ, F-S F , and EGK fading channels, respectively. Each
figure witnesses perfect agreements between the exact analysis
and simulated results. Besides, it is clear that the influences of
L on Pnz,MRC is larger than that on Pnz,SC . This is obviously
due to the MRC and SC schemes.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Since Fox’s H-function fading channel can subsume most of
the fading models, this paper comprehensively investigated the
PLS over Fox’s H-function wiretap fading channels, with con-
sideration of the non-colluding and colluding eavesdropping
scenarios. For the former non-colluding case, secrecy metrics,
including the SOP, PNZ, and ASC, are derived with closed-
form expressions in a general and unified manner. Those
expressions are given in terms of the univariate or bivariate
Fox’s H-function. In addition, those closed-form expressions
were further simplified to acquire the asymptotic behavior of
the secrecy metrics. The asymptotic ones were much simpler
and highly accurate for practical usage. In the presence of
colluding eavesdroppers, a super eavesdropper employing by
MRC or SC schemes were formulated, and subsequently the
lower bound of SOP and the exact PNZ were provided in terms
of multivariate Fox’s H-function. Both scenarios are further
demonstrated by Monte-Carlo simulations.
In addition, for the sake of providing more insights on
some well-known fading models, several special cases of Fox’s
H-function distribution were particularly explored, including
α − µ, F-S F , and EGK. Those examples were further
elaborated with the general form, and their accuracy was also
compared with Monte-Carlo simulation results. As observed
and discussed, the advantages of those general mathematical
representations are listed as follows: (i) they are consistent
with the existing works; (ii) they provide a unified generic
approach to other fading models which can be expanded in
terms of Fox’s H-function fading distribution; and (iii) they
provide a promising secrecy performance analysis framework
when colluding eavesdroppers are undergoing different inde-
pendent fading conditions.
APPENDIX A
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At the very beginning, revisiting (12a)
Pout =
∫ ∞
0
FB(γ0) fE (γE )dγE
= 1 −
∫ ∞
0
F¯B(γ0) fE (γE )dγE
= 1 − 1
2pi j
∫
L1
M[F¯B(γ0), 1 − s]M[ fE (γE ), s]ds,
(41)
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Fig. 4: The lower bound of SOP, i.e., PLout over Fox’s H-
function fading channels, (a) α − µ, αB = 2 (b) EGK; and (c)
F-S F .
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Fig. 5: Pnz,MRC , Pnz,SC versus γ¯B over (a) α− µ, (b) F-S F ,
and (c) EGK wiretap fading channels.
and using the definition of Mellin transform and Fox’s H-
function, we arrive at M[FB(s)]
M[FB(γ0), 1 − s] =
∫ ∞
0
γ−sE FB(γ0)dγE
(a)
=
κB
2λBpi j
∫
L1
Θ
F
B (ξ)λ−ξB
∫ ∞
0
γ−sE γ
−ξ
0
dγEdξ,
(42)
where step (a) is developed by interchanging the order of two
integrals. The inner integral in (42) can be further expressed
as ∫ ∞
0
γ−sE γ
−ξ
0
dγE =W−ξ
∫ ∞
0
γ−sE
(
1 +
Rs
W γE
)−ξ
dγE
(b)
=
B(1 − s, ξ + s − 1)
Wξ
(
Rs
W
)s−1 (c)
=
Γ(1 − s)Γ(ξ + s − 1)
Γ(ξ)Wξ
(
Rs
W
)1−s ,
(43)
where step (b) is developed from [41, eq. (3.194.3)], and step
(c) is obtained by using B(x, y) = Γ(x)Γ(y)
Γ(x+y) [41, eq. (8.384.1)].
Plugging (43) into (42), yields the result given in (34), and
step (d) is directly achieved from the definition of bivariate
Fox’s H-function.
Subsequently, substituting (34) andM[ fE (γE ), s] = κE χ
f
E
(s)
λs
E
into (41), yields the following result
Pout = 1 −
κBκEW
4λBRspi2
∫
L1
∫
L2
Γ(ξ + s − 1)ΘF¯
B
(ξ)
Γ(ξ) (λBW)ξ
× Γ(1 − s)Θ f
E
(s)
(
Rs
λEW
)s
dξds,
(35)
Next, deploying the definition of the bivariate Fox’s H-
function [41], the proof is achieved.
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Since the logarithm function can be alternatively re-
expressed in terms of Fox’s H-function with the help from
[44, eq. (8.4.6.5)] and [44, eq. (8.3.2.21)],
ln(1 + x) = H1,2
2,2
[
x
 (1, 1), (1, 1)(1, 1), (0, 1)
]
, (36)
For the ease of proof, we take the proof for I1 as an example.
I1 =
1
2pi j
∫
L1
M[FE (γB), s]M[g(γB), 1 − s]ds, (37)
M[FE (γB), s] =
κE
λ1+s
E
Θ
F
E (s), (38)
where ΘFE (s) is shown in (39) on the top of next page.
M[gk(γk), 1 − s] can be regarded as the Mellin transform
of the product of two Fox’s H-function [44, eq. (2.25.1.1)],
which is given by (40) and shown on the top of next page.
Next, substituting (38) and (40) into (37), yields
I1 = − κBκE
4pi2λBλE
∫
L1
∫
L2
Θ(s, ξ)Θ(ξ)ΘF
E
(s)(
λE
λB
)s
λ
ξ
B
dsdξ, (41)
where Θ(s, ξ) and Θ(ξ) are given by (42), shown on the top
of next page.
12
M[FB(γ0), 1 − s]
(d)
=
κB
2λBpi j
(
Rs
W
)s−1
Γ(1 − s)
∫
L1
Γ(ξ + s − 1)ΘF
B
(ξ)
Γ(ξ) (λBW)
−ξdξ
=
κBΓ(1 − s)
λB
(
Rs
W
)s−1
H
m0+1,n0+1
p0+2,q0+2
[
λBW
 (1, 1), (aj + Aj, Aj )j=1:p0, (0, 1)(s − 1, 1), (bj + Bj, Bj)j=1:q0, (0, 1)
]
.
(34)
Θ
F
E (s) =
Γ(−s)
m1∏
l=1
Γ(dl + Dl + Dls)
Γ(1 − s)
q1∏
l=m1+1
Γ(1 − dl − Dl − Dls)
n1∏
i=1
Γ(1 − ci − Ci − Cis)
p1∏
i=n1+1
Γ(ci + Ci + Cis)
, (39)
M[gB(γB), 1 − s] =
∫ ∞
0
γ−sB ln(1 + γB) fB(γB)dγB = κB
∫ ∞
0
γ−sB H
1,2
2,2
[
x
 (1, 1), (1, 1)(1, 1), (0, 1)
]
H
m0,n0
p0,q0
[
λBγB
 (aj, Aj )j=1:p0(bj, Bj )j=1:q0
]
dγB
=
κB
λ1−s
B
H
n0+1,m0+2
q0+2,p0+2
[
1
λB
 (1, 1), (1, 1), (1 − bj − (1 − s)Bj, Bj )j=1:q1(1, 1), (1 − aj − (1 − s)Aj, Aj )j=1:p1, (0, 1)
]
(40)
Θ(s, ξ) =
n0∏
i=1
Γ(1 − ai − Ai + Ais + Aiξ)
m0∏
l=1
Γ(bl + Bl − Bls − Blξ)
p0∏
i=n0+1
Γ(ai + Ai − Ais − Aiξ)
q0∏
l=m0+1
Γ(1 − bl − Bl + Bls + Blξ)
, Θ(ξ) = Γ(1 + ξ)Γ(−ξ)Γ(−ξ)
Γ(1 − ξ) . (42)
Next, replacing ξ = −η, s = −τ, I1 can be expressed as
(21a) in terms of the bivariate Fox’s H-function. In particular,
when n1 = 0, I1 is further simplified in terms of the extended
generalized bivariate Fox’s H-function. Following the same
methodology, I2 can be obtained. I3 can be finally achieved
from [29, eq. (18)],
I3 =
κE
2pi j
∫
L1
M{ln(1 + γE ), s}λ−1+sE Θ fE (1 − s)ds
=
κE
λE
H
n1+1,m1+2
q1+2,p1+2
[
1
λE
(1, 1), (1, 1), (1 − dl − Dl, Dl)l=1:p1(1, 1), (1 − ci − Ci,Ci)i=1:q1, (0, 1)
]
.
(43)
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Specifically, at high γ¯B regime, I1 can be expanded at the
pole, i.e., ξ = 0, since ξ = 0 is the second order pole, as such,
by using the residue theorem, we have
Res
[
Θ(s, ξ)Θ(ξ)
λ
ξ
B
, 0
]
= lim
ξ→0
d
dξ
ξ2Θ(s, ξ)Γ(ξ)2Γ(1 − ξ)
λ
ξ
B
Γ(1 + ξ)
(44)
Using the fact that dΓ(s)
ds
= Γ(s)Ψ0(s) and the general Leibniz
rule, we have
Res
[
Θ(s, ξ)Θ(ξ)
λ
ξ
B
, 0
]
= Θ(s, 0)
[
m0∑
l=1
BlΨ0(bl + Bl + Bls)
−
n0∑
j=1
AjΨ0(1 − aj − Aj − Aj s) +
q0∑
l=m0+1
BlΨ0(1 − bl − Bl − Bls)
−
p0∑
i=n0+1
AiΨ0(ai + Ai + Ais) − ln λB
]
,
(45)
and subsequently when
λE
λB
→ ∞, we evaluate the residue at
s, where
s = max
[
0,
(
−bl + Bl
Bl
)
l=1, · · · ,m0
,
(
ci + Ci − 1
ci
)
i=1, · · · ,n1
]
. (46)
Considering all poles are simple, we arrive at the derived
asymptotic I1.
Similarly, at high γ¯B regime, I2 can be obtained at the point
u = min
(
bl+Bl
Bl
)
l=1, · · · ,m0
, the proof is subsequently completed.
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